NAPOLEONIC EUROPE (1799-1815)
The Continental System (1806-1807)
After his Navy was
destroyed at Trafalgar in 1805, Napoleon realized that if his empire was ever
going to be secure, he would have to defeat Britain. With his navy gone,
Napoleon knew a direct assault on island was for the time impossible, so he
decided to wage economic war against the "nation of shopkeepers", as
he called the British. His plan to bring Britain to its knees was called the
Continental System. British goods were to be restricted from entering Europe.
Napoleon demanded that his empire close its ports from British goods, and he
got the Russians, Austrians, and Prussians to cooperate in the Continental
System. Without having the European market to buy up its manufactures, Napoleon
hoped Britain would undergo a severe depression, hurting the nation's economy
and ability to maintain such a powerful navy. Meanwhile, Napoleon was building
ships of his own. Napoleon wanted to hobble the British economy and give France
a chance to build up its own manufacturing and industry.
The Continental System
began in 1806 with Napoleon's Berlin Decree, which banned British ships from
entering European ports. Britain, full of savvy traders, made a concerted
effort to undermine the Continental System by contracting out its shipments to
neutral vessels. Napoleon next issued the Milan Decree in December 1807. This
harsh decree, aimed against smuggling, stated that neutral ships that stopped
in Britain before landing in Europe were subject to confiscation.
Britain's retaliated
through sea power, creating a blockade of all European ships. If Europe
wouldn't allow British ships to dock at European ports, Britain wouldn't allow
European ships to sail on what was then Britain's ocean.
Commentary
The other nations of Europe
were willing to side with Napoleon in the Continental system because for the
most part they did dislike Britain. Britain was wealthy,
rapidly industrialized, and isolationist. Cranking out textiles on their small
island, the British rapidly became the wealthiest nation in Europe. Using its
naval dominance, England built up colonies and trade networks for its
manufactures that were the envy of all of Europe. So when Napoleon demanded
that a Europe- wide boycott of British goods take place under his Continental
System, there were many who were glad for a chance to cut Britain down to size.
The British blockade
preventing European ships from sailing was not intended to "starve"
Europe or make it suffer in any direct sense. Europe was capable of producing
its own food and its own weapons without British help. Britain's real goal was
to stop France and its allies from trading throughout Europe using shipping. In
these days, there were no railways, so most transfer of goods from city to city
and country-to-country was accomplished by boat. Unable to trade by sea routes,
goods had to be moved about in Europe by wagons, a slower, more difficult means
of transport use that were particularly poor for crossing mountainous areas.
The British blockade thus severely handicapped internal European trading, which
needed sea-shipping to operate at full capacity.
It is interesting to think
of Napoleon's Continental System as an early kind of European Economic
Community (EEC), where the nations of Europe banded together to strengthen
their economy against underselling by an outside force (in Napoleon's period,
Britain). The major goal of the Continental System, like the EEC, was to
improve Europe's economy and give it more leverage in trading.
REFERENCE
Bergeron, Louis, et al. France Under Napoleon. Princeton University Press: 1981.
Chapman, Tim. The
Congress of Vienna : Origins, Processes and Results. Routledge: 1998.
Durant, William James, et al. The Age of Napoleon: A History of
European Civilization from 1789 to 1815. Simon
& Schuster: 1975
James, Cyril Lionel Robert. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint
L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution. 2nd ed. Vintage Books: 1989.
Rothenberg, Gunther E. Art of Warfare in the Age of
Napoleon. Indiana University
Press: 1981.
Tone, John Lawrence. The Fatal Knot: The Guerilla War in
Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain. University of North Carolina Press:
1994.
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