INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION.
To the end of the early modern period, Europe remained
a preindustrial society. Its manufactured goods came from small workshops, and
most of its machinery was powered by animals, wind, falling water, or human
labor. These two facts reinforced each other, and together they constricted
Europe's economic development. Water-powered manufacturing, for instance, could
develop only in favored regions and remained constantly subject to
weather-related interruptions; with limited supplies of power, there was little
reason to concentrate manufacturing processes in large workshops. By 1850,
however, these descriptions no longer applied to large areas of western Europe,
and by 1914 the European economy as a whole was dominated by large factories,
many of them employing thousands of workers. Both manufacturing and
transportation now relied on steam power, and gasoline and electric motors were
becoming common. The quantity and variety of goods manufactured rose
accordingly, a transformation suggested by the development of the British iron
industry:Britain produced about 30,000 tons of pig iron
in 1760, about one million tons in 1810. Contemporary awareness of change
advanced even more quickly than the reality. In his 1848Manifesto of the Communist
Party, written at a
time when most Europeans still worked in agriculture and when even British
manufacturing was still evenly divided between factories and small workshops, Karl Marx (1818–1883)
presented industrialization as the obvious destiny of all European society. The
rapidity of these changes and their far-reaching effects amply justify
historians' designation of the period as the "industrial revolution."
In the century after 1780, European life was transformed.
Industrialization thus numbers among
the most important processes that brought the early modern period to a close,
and as such it raises important questions about the period itself. Signs of
dramatic economic and technological change were already apparent in later
eighteenth-century Britain, prompting historians to ask how this phase of rapid
change could have emerged from the relatively stable early modern economy and why
it emerged first in Britain. More broadly, historians have asked why Europe
industrialized ahead of other regions of the globe, and what contributions
Europe's empires in the Americas and elsewhere made to its industrialization.
Answers to these questions have been varied and surprising. Though the concept
of industrialization itself remains unchallenged, recent historical research
has overturned much conventional wisdom about how the process took place.
MANUFACTURING BEFORE INDUSTRIALIZATION
Though it lacked factories and steam
engines, pre-industrial Europe did not have a static economy, and manufacturing
counted for a significant share of its total economic activity—about
one-fourth of France's gross national product and almost
40 percent of Britain's in the early eighteenth century, one historian has
estimated. In some regions, such as the Netherlandsand northern Italy, the
percentages might have been even higher, but the difficulties of early modern
transportation meant that manufacturing was widely dispersed; with
transportation costs high, producers had a strong incentive to establish their
workshops near the sources of their raw materials and to focus on meeting the
needs of regional markets. Despite this fragmentation, early modern producers
regularly introduced new products and adopted new techniques. In the thirteenth
century, for instance, Italian craftsmen learned how to make silk cloth, and
their techniques spread north of the Alps in
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, so that by the eighteenth century the
French city of Lyon numbered several thousand silk weavers. The technology of
silk weaving changed as well, most dramatically with the invention of the
Jacquard loom in the 1720s. The new loom had mechanical codes that governed the
weaving process, allowing a relatively unskilled weaver to produce a complex
product. In an early version of a process that would be frequently repeated
during the industrial revolution, the balance between machine and worker had
shifted; knowledge could be embedded in the machine, rendering differences
among workers less important. Likewise, calico cloths fromIndia created
a sensation when first introduced in later seventeenth-century England. They were quickly imitated by
British manufacturers, who effectively established an altogether new industry.
A stream of inventions thus changed
manufacturing over the early modern period, but the most important changes that
the period witnessed had to do with the organization of work rather than its
technology. Most European cities restricted manufacturing work, limiting access
to some trades so that those already established in them could continue to
enjoy respectable incomes and controlling the amounts that workshops might
produce to prevent any one manufacturer from acquiring too dominant a position.
Impatient with such restrictions, from the seventeenth century on, merchants in
many regions organized new forms of production in the countryside. Labor there
was cheap and abundant since contemporary agriculture left many peasants
underemployed, and economic restrictions were weak. Cloth merchants were
especially well placed to take advantage of this opportunity. They supplied
villagers with raw materials, transported goods from one stage of production to
the next, and finally marketed the finished product, taking as well the largest
share of the profits. Other goods too could be manufactured in this way: in
eastern France and Switzerland, merchants organized clock
making on these lines. By the mid-eighteenth century, the balance between
agriculture and manufacturing had shifted in many regions; for most villagers,
farm work had become a supplemental source of income, and they relied mainly on
spinning, weaving, and other artisanal activities for their livelihoods.
Historians have applied several names
to this process. The term cottage industry accurately captures the fact that this
system of manufacturing left unchanged the basic conditions of its workers'
lives. Spinners, weavers, and others continued to live in small villages and
continued to work according to their own preferences, as independent
contractors who owned their equipment. But historians have also spoken of this
process as proto-industrialization, a
term that emphasizes the new economic relationships and expectations, as well
as the demographic consequences, created by this system. Though they set their
own pace of work, those involved in cottage industry nonetheless depended on
far-flung economic networks; their goods were produced for national and
international markets, and the workers were subject to the economic power of
the merchants who sold what they produced. The proto-industrial workforce was
in some sense a proletariat, whose economic fate rested with others; some
historians have suggested that these workers were in effect learning the habits
that they would eventually need to work in the factories of the nineteenth
century.
But as important as its implications
for work discipline were, the rise of cottage industry also changed European
buying. As the historian Jan de Vries has argued, seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century families were working harder than they had in the past in exchange
for the ability to buy more goods: cottage industry allowed women and children
to earn cash incomes, and it converted what had been the family's leisure time—especially
the slow phases of the agricultural cycle—into
cash as well. Well before the onset of industrialization, European
manufacturers thus had available to them a large consumer market, one eager for
small luxury goods. Historians have turned to probate inventories to
demonstrate the breadth of the consumer revolution that these centuries brought
to England, the Netherlands, France, and Germany.
Even backward areas showed the effects of these changes, with families buying
mirrors, clocks, brightly printed clothing, prints, and a variety of other
manufactured goods. But the effects were most visible in the developing cities
of the age. The largest city of early modern Europe, London, by itself
concentrated about 16 percent of England's population—an
enormous, conveniently centralized and accessible market for manufactured
goods. Paris was
smaller in absolute numbers and much smaller relative to total French
population, but it too offered manufacturers an enormous, fashion-conscious
market for new goods.
TOWARD THE NEW ECONOMY
A critical aspect of the industrial
revolution was the effort of manufacturers to take advantage of these markets,
most visibly in the clothing industry. By the early eighteenth century, a
fundamental step had already been taken: clothing manufacturers increasingly
devoted their attention to lightweight, cheap, easily-colored fabrics, rather
than the high-quality woolens that had dominated the medieval textile industry.
In the early seventeenth century, they shifted to producing the lightweight
woolen fabrics known in Britain as "new draperies"; later in the
century, the arrival of cotton calicoes and muslins from India produced
enormous enthusiasm among consumers and led to efforts both to exclude such
imports and to replace them with British-made cotton goods. Over the eighteenth
century, manufacturers produced a variety of fabrics that mixed cotton with
other fibers, because British thread was usually too weak for producing
all-cotton cloths. Throughout, popular demand played a crucial role, and in
mid-eighteenth-century Britain cotton producers could not keep up with the
demand for their products. In response they introduced a series of
technological innovations designed to speed up the manufacturing process and to
create other attractive new cotton products. Improvements in weaving starting
in the 1730s created pressure on the spinning process, which produced cotton
thread; at this point it took eight spinners to produce enough thread to supply
one weaver, and several inventors sought to produce machines that could do the
job more quickly. Solutions came in the 1760s and 1770s, with the spinning
jenny, the water frame, and the spinning mule, all devices that allowed a
single operator to manage multiple spindles—and
that produced a higher-quality, more even thread than hand spinning.
Contemporaries immediately recognized the value of these machines, and they
spread rapidly, transforming the relationship between spinning and weaving.
With spinning increasingly mechanized, there was now pressure to mechanize
weaving—a
more difficult task, with a first power loom invented in 1787 but not widely
used until the early nineteenth century. But though handloom weaving remained
dominant, a revolution in the cotton industry had already occurred by the end
of the eighteenth century: between 1770 and 1800 imports of raw cotton to Britain
increased twelvefold.
New machinery encouraged new ways of
organizing work. The spinning jenny was designed as a hand-operated device, and
could be adapted to the needs of cottage industry. But the water frame was
larger and from the beginning required an external power source to drive it.
Richard Arkwright (1732–1792),
who held the patent on it, immediately established a set of water-driven mills
to exploit the new invention, and the economies of scale that these factories
enjoyed meant that by 1800 cottage spinning had largely disappeared. The larger
machinery also required a new approach to managing labor. Necessarily
centralized around a single source of power, the new machines required close
management in order to repay their heavy costs. The factory thus encouraged a
new degree of labor discipline, with workers required to report to work at
exact hours and labor at a pace set by the factory's managers. The Arkwright
mills and their competitors made an immediate impression on contemporaries; the
artist Joseph Wright of Derby (1734–1797)
painted them, and the poet William Blake (1757–1827)
in about 1805 already spoke of "dark Satanic Mills" transforming the
British landscape.
Blake found the mills
"Satanic" partly because by his time a growing number of them relied
on steam power. The development of steam technology represented a second
critical strand in the industrial revolution, and, as with the development of
cotton manufacturing, its origins lay in the seventeenth century, in a
combination of scientific, technological, and ecological developments. As late
as the mid-seventeenth century, scientists such as René Descartes
(1596–1650)
doubted that a vacuum was even possible, but his contemporary, the Italian
physicist Evangelista Torricelli (1608–1647),
and others demonstrated both the possibility and its practical implications.
Inventors developed a series of pumps based on this idea, and in 1698 the
Englishman Thomas Savery (c. 1650–1715)
developed the first working steam engine, essentially a machine for creating a
vacuum and using its suction to lift water. A much-improved version was
developed by the Englishman Thomas Newcomen (1663–1729),
and in 1712 a Newcomen engine was set to work pumping out coal mines
in northern England; by the 1730s such engines were in operation in several
European countries. As the economic historian Joel Mokyr has observed, this was
the world's first economically viable mechanism for transforming heat into
regular motion, the artificial power that would be at the center of
industrialization. The Newcomen engine performed its task very inefficiently,
though, and in 1776 the first of James Watt's (1736–1819)
engines was put into commercial operation, allowing a fourfold improvement in
efficiency. By 1800, about 2,500 steam engines had been built in Britain, most
of them used in mines, but many powering iron foundries, cotton-spinning
machines, and other industrial processes. Contemporaries understood that a
technological revolution was underway, and despite the inefficiency of the
early engines, inventors immediately began exploring new ways to use them.
Steam hammers, rolling mills, and bellows revolutionized the British iron
industry from the 1760s on; in 1783 a first steamboat was constructed (in
France), and in 1803 a first steam locomotive. By the 1820s, railway
construction had begun, and a steam-powered ship had crossed the Atlantic.
This sequence of inventions and
applications was closely bound up with the availability of cheap fuel, yet
another element of the early modern economy that came to full development
during the industrial revolution. Coal had long been known as a fuel, but
contemporaries disliked its smoke and smell. By the mid-seventeenth century, however,
Britons had little choice but to make use of it, for the country was running
short of wood and it was becoming too expensive to use as fuel for even the
basic needs of heating, let alone for novel industrial uses. The enormous size
of seventeenth-century London, over half a million people within easy reach of
cheap water transport, and its insatiable demand for fuel ensured that coal
mining could be profitable even in the face of technological obstacles. As
mines became deeper, for instance, there was the problem of removing the water
that seeped into them—the
problem that steam-driven pumps eventually answered. Steam-driven vehicles and
carts that moved along rails (radically reducing friction) were first employed
in the British coal fields as well. The economics of coal-mining made even the
inefficiencies of early steam power acceptable; operating in the coal fields
themselves, the first steam engines had a readily available supply of cheap
fuel and could even use some of the waste from the mining process. With a fully
developed coal-mining industry, and increasingly sophisticated means of using
the energy that coal contained, Britain suddenly increased its supply of power
many times over. The historian Kenneth Pomeranz has argued that only with this step
did Europe move clearly ahead of Asian technology, setting the stage for
Europe's domination of the world economy during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. This interpretation probably understates the significance of other
differences, but it accurately captures an important aspect of the industrial
revolution: during the eighteenth century, Britain acquired a seemingly
limitless supply of power.
Coal played an especially important
role in the iron industry, which constituted the fourth strand of industrialization.
Iron and steel had been important to European technology since theMiddle Ages, but expensive production
processes limited their uses. Like other early modern manufacturing,
iron-making relied on the experience and skill of a mass of individual
artisans, whose small foundries permitted close inspection of each piece that
they produced. Steel was even more clearly a specialized product, requiring
superior iron ore found mainly in Sweden; forged by hand, it was reserved
for such uses as weaponry, and was much too expensive for more mundane
products. But starting in the early eighteenth century, the availability of coal
and steam engines to power blowers (to create very high temperatures) and
hammers (to remove impurities) stimulated a sequence of new iron-making
processes, and these dramatically changed the industry's economics. Because
expensive machinery was essential to these techniques, iron production was
increasingly concentrated in huge enterprises, most dramatically that of the
ironmaster John Wilkinson (1728–1808);
but once the machinery was in place, it allowed the use of lower-grade, cheaper
ores. Costs fell accordingly, and by the late eighteenth century, the
availability of cheap iron made it possible to envision an entirely new range
of uses for it.
This enthusiasm for spreading
innovations to new economic domains was a further characteristic of the later
eighteenth century, and it meant that the industrial revolution transformed
numerous areas of the British economy, not just cotton, iron-making, and steam
power. Cheap iron, for instance, allowed for the creation of new machine tools,
and when combined with steam power, these made possible mechanized production
of numerous products that once had been made by hand. Steam power and coal fuel
allowed the potter Josiah Wedgwood (1730–1795)
to establish mass production processes in making porcelain, until then a luxury
good. Inventors began to think about the possibilities of using iron in
buildings and ships. Economic transformations of these kinds did not mean the
end of small workshops or skilled artisans. On the contrary, the development of
machine making required more workshops and highly skilled laborers, and many
consumer products lent themselves to small-scale production. Even after the
advent of power looms, handloom weavers remained numerous and prosperous well
into the nineteenth century. But by 1800 it was clear to all that dramatic
change was likely to affect all domains of the economy; technological advances
had become normal, and contemporaries expected that it would transform new
areas of economic activity.
GEOGRAPHIES
Overwhelmingly, the technological
innovations that marked eighteenth-century industrialization took place in
Britain. Understanding this British dynamism has been an enduring historical
problem, producing both classic answers and intense debate among historians.
Geographical accidents offer one explanation for British success. Britain had
abundant supplies of coal of a quality especially well suited to iron
production, and its lack of wood forced it to exploit this resource from the
seventeenth century on; in contrast, France had plenty of wood and relatively
little coal, and Holland had only peat, which could not produce the high
temperatures needed for large-scale iron production. As a relatively small
island with numerous navigable rivers, Britain also enjoyed the advantages of
cheap water transportation, which allowed the development of an unusually
well-integrated national market. The remarkable development of
seventeenth-century London offered further economic advantages; as the British
historian Anthony Wrigley pointed out a generation ago, London offered a large,
concentrated market for industrial products, far more important as a share of
the nation's population than contemporary Paris, and it provided a laboratory
for new social practices, encouraging both producers and consumers to try out
new products. Historians have also noted the chronological accidents that aided
British industrial development. During most of the eighteenth century, French
economic growth roughly equaled British, but the generation of political chaos
that followed the French Revolution of 1789 gave British manufacturers a chance
to establish themselves in new markets, with little competition from
continental industry. By the end of the Revolutionary Wars, in 1815, Britain
had fully established its economic supremacy in Europe.
Efforts to explain British economic
successes in terms of culture, politics, and social organization have
stimulated more debate among historians. In its social structure, Britain was
as aristocratic as other European countries, and its merchants were as eager as
merchants elsewhere to achieve acceptance among the landed gentry. But the
British aristocracy was probably unusual in the respect that it accorded
commerce and manufacturing, and the gentry-dominated British Parliament energetically
defended commercial and manufacturing interests against foreign competition.
British law was certainly unusual in the protections it gave inventors and
property holders. Between 1624 and 1791, Britain was the only European nation
with a system of patent laws, designed to give inventors the profits of their
achievements. The system both encouraged innovation and expressed British
society's admiration for it. In other respects, however, differences between
Britain and other countries were less significant. Acquisitive, profit-oriented
economic attitudes characterized most of eighteenth-century Europe; and Britain
was like other Protestant countries of the early modern period in having a
relatively well-educated working class. As for advanced education in the
sciences and engineering, eighteenth-century Britain lagged well behind France.
By the late eighteenth century,
Britain was also Europe's leading imperial power, holding territories in North
America, the Caribbean, and India, and benefiting from the trade in African
slaves. Many historians have seen in this global power a further important
explanation for British industrialization. Colonies, they have argued, offered
raw materials at a discount and ready markets for industrial goods, and the
high profits generated by colonial trade permitted British merchants to make
expensive investments in machines and factories. But recent scholarship has
tended to present colonial markets and materials as only a secondary cause of
British economic successes. Few historians would deny the rapacity of
eighteenth-century imperialism or the determination of British governments to
use any means that might advance the country's economic interests; to protect
domestic cotton manufacturers, for instance, importation of Indian cloth was
rigorously prohibited. As the Spanish empire of the sixteenth century had
demonstrated, however, colonial possessions were no guarantee of industrial
development; and the profits of colonial trade were not especially high in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The critical fact in Britain's economic
development seems to have been the demand for goods within the country itself
and the readiness of manufacturers to use novel means to meet that demand.
Colonialism perhaps mattered less as a source of capital than as a source of
economic novelties, encouraging Europe as a whole and Britain in particular to
undertake business innovations. Such colonial products as tea, coffee, tobacco,
and sugar were among the early mass-market luxuries that became the model for
later industrial production. More substantial goods like Chinese ceramics and
Indian cotton fabrics stimulated determined, and eventually successful, efforts
at imitation. The eighteenth-century global economy thus helps to explain Britain's
industrialization; indeed, based on a product that did not grow in Europe, the
cotton industry itself was only conceivable in the setting of a global economy.
But the critical fact was manufacturers' readiness to respond to opportunities
that the global economy presented.
THE EXPERIENCE OF WORK AND THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY
"Everything that is solid melts
into air," wrote Karl Marx to describe the changes that he saw
accompanying the industrialization of Europe. Until well after World War II,
most historians of the industrial revolution shared Marx's sense of the period
as one of overwhelming social change, both positive and negative. Like
contemporaries, historians have been dazzled by the wave of new products and
processes that the period brought forth during what Mokyr has called "the
age of miracles." Historians have also been struck by the new kinds of
work organization that machines required. Preindustrial work tended to be
individualistic, with workers setting their own pace; in cottage industry,
moments of intense activity alternated with moments of relaxation, and as
independent contractors, workers could take on as much work as they chose.
Factory work allowed for no such freedoms. Work had to be continuous and
coordinated if investments in steam engines, machinery, and buildings were to
pay off. Labor discipline thus represented an important aspect of the
transition to the factory system; for many ordinary people, this was the point
at which clock time became an essential component of daily life and the pocket
watch the sign of one's responsibility. The role of skill also diminished in
the factory setting. What was needed was someone to tend machines, and this
could just as easily be children as adults. Deskilling of this kind represented
a loss of both status and income to workers who had been used to the freedom of
working on their own. Having reduced the role of skill, factory owners could
effectively control the wages they paid; an unskilled worker dissatisfied with
his income could easily be replaced by another.
On the other hand, much recent
scholarship has drawn attention to continuities between the pre-industrial
world and what followed, and to the complexities of industrial development
itself. As a result, this line of scholarship has offered more nuanced views of
the society that early industrialization produced than were previously
available. One reason for this caution has been historians' growing knowledge
of preindustrial economies, both in Europe and in the world at large. These economies
were capable of considerable growth, and they offered their inhabitants
considerable material abundance. Rather than a complete break with the past,
therefore, the industrial revolution in significant ways represented a
culmination of earlier developments. Historians have also given more attention
to the survival of small workshops and skilled work during the industrial
revolution. Because the factory system relied so heavily on complex machinery,
it created whole new forms of skilled labor in the trades that built and
maintained machinery. Small workshops thrived in many other developing trades
as well, notably those that produced small metal goods like buttons, buckles,
cheap jewelry, guns, and so on, trades that employed about half the workforce of
Birmingham, one of Britain's most important industrial cities. The historian
Maxine Berg has shown that even the introduction of steam power did not bring
the factory system to these trades; instead, several small workshops could
share the power of a single steam engine, for instance by renting space in a
large building. Even the early textile factories retained some aspects of
preindustrial work organization. Family relations continued to count in the
factory, and for many manufacturing processes small groups needed to work
closely together.
In one respect, however, traditional
depictions of industrialization retain their full force: already in late
eighteenth-century Britain, early industrialization had created zones of
intensive industrial activity that grouped together mining, metallurgy, and a
variety of related trades, creating a new kind of physical environment and new
social relations. Coal was expensive to transport, and breakage during shipment
made it useless in the blast furnaces that produced wrought iron. It thus
proved economical to concentrate iron making near the coal fields, and other
industrial processes tended to follow. Cotton textiles tended to concentrate
also, around the fast-growing city of Manchester, while metal working developed
in the city of Birmingham. With the expansion of these highly developed
industrial centers, the more evenly dispersed industrial activity of the early
eighteenth century tended to disappear. A number of regions that had been
important manufacturing centers in the early modern period returned to purely
agricultural pursuits, while the new industrial zones became crowded with
manufacturing activities, reducing any mixture with agriculture to mere
vestiges. Contemporaries found these new industrial regions appalling. As
rapidly growing new towns, they lacked basic services and traditional forms of
social organization. The combination of haphazard development, inadequate water
supplies, coal smoke, and industrial wastes made them unhealthy, and
contemporaries believed that the social conditions of industrial life added to
the problem. Young people, for instance, earned wages that freed them from the
controls that parents earlier exercised over them, and allowed them to indulge
in a variety of unwholesome pastimes; they had little or no time for school.
Industrial zones like these were genuine challenges to the established order of
European society. They offered the spectacle of new disorder among laborers—and
of new wealth among factory owners. From a modest background, Richard Arkwright
became extremely wealthy from his cotton-spinning mills, and made a point of
displaying his wealth in conspicuous ways. He was only one of many
industrialists to do so.
But historians have become cautious in
interpreting descriptions of this sort, and more alert to the ideological
commentaries they contained. If observers were impressed at the forms of
misbehavior that characterized the new industrial towns, this to some extent
reflected their fears of social change and their inability to see the social
relationships that in fact characterized them. It also reflected their limited
attention to the evils of preindustrial work, which was altogether ready to
employ women and children. Despite their unhealthy conditions, the new
industrial centers paid high wages and attracted workers. In the same way, the
dramatic rise of new fortunes from industry to some extent obscured from
contemporary observers the ability of old elites to profit from economic
innovation. Britain's great aristocrats were especially well placed to benefit
from the development of mining and metallurgy, controlling as they did many of
the country's coal deposits; during the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, they showed themselves alert and inventive in profiting from these
opportunities, so that their wealth rose in tandem with that of the new
industrialists—allowing
them to continue dominating Britain's politics down to the eve of World War I.
Historians have demonstrated similar adaptations in continental Europe, with
old ruling groups effectively profiting from industrialization. If the
industrial revolution helped bring the early modern period to a close, it thus
also preserved some of that period's characteristic forms of social
organization.
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Jonathan Dewald
Social Plugin