The Ottoman Empire
had exercised formal sovereignty over the lands of Arabia since the early 16th
century. For much of that time it had ruled with a comparatively light touch,
garrisoning key trading ports and maintaining an official presence in the Islamic
holy cities of Mecca and Medina, but otherwise leaving the region and its
nomadic tribal clans to their own devices.
By comparison, the rural
Arab populations of Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Egypt were much
more settled than their counterparts in Arabia and were subject to direct
control by the Ottoman imperial administration. The inhabitants of these
regions largely accepted this arrangement: Arab (Sunni) Muslims faced little,
if any, discrimination for most of the empire’s history and in fact came to
dominate the local Ottoman imperial administration.
Through these different
approaches the Ottoman Turks maintained the loyalty of their diverse Muslim
Arab subjects.
But as the Ottoman Empire
entered the First World War in 1914 this loyalty could no longer be taken for
granted, for two reasons. The first was the growth of a nascent Arab
nationalism that drew inspiration from 19th-century Western ideas. Some
Arabs looked to the nationalist movements of the Slavic (and mostly
Christian) minorities of the Ottoman Balkan territories, which had, by the end
of 1912, all won their independence. This Arab nationalism was largely fostered
by educated urban elites – intellectuals, civil servants and former or serving
officers in the Ottoman Army – living in great Arab cities like Damascus and
Baghdad. A number of secret societies were formed, although none of these
succeeded in spreading their ideas to the wider Arab population before the
outbreak of the First World War.
The second unsettling factor
was the completion in 1908 of the Hejaz railway, which provided a direct link
between Medina and Damascus, greatly facilitating Ottoman access to the Arabian
interior. When it opened, Ottoman authorities emphasised the benefits to
Muslims undertaking the religious obligation of the Hajj – the annual
pilgrimage to Mecca.
But traditional Arab clan
leaders in the Hejaz region were quick to realise that a train that could
deliver 1000 devout pilgrims overnight from Damascus could also swiftly deliver
1000 imperial tax collectors, customs inspectors and other bureaucrats – or 1000
heavily armed Ottoman soldiers. This intrusion was especially resented by the
Hashemite clan, who ruled the region and could claim descent from the family of
the Prophet Muhammed. The clan’s leader in 1914 was 61-year-old Sharif Hussein
ibn Ali, a regional figure of considerable standing and political acumen.
By 1914 unrest had already
broken out among the tribes of the central Arabian interior, where Abdul Aziz
ibn Saud, in alliance with the Wahabi Islamist movement, openly condemned the
Ottoman government of the Young Turks as anti-Islamic. At the same time the
implementation of the government’s pan-Turkic nationalist agenda alienated many
of the empire's previously loyal Arab subjects in Syria, Palestine and
Mesopotamia. The city-based Arab nationalist groups were quick to exploit the
seeds of a popular Arab backlash against Enver Pasha and the Young Turks for
their own ends.
The Ottoman Empire’s entry
into the First World War in November 1914 provided the final spark for outright
revolt. The British, through their control of Egypt and the port of Aden at the
entrance to the Red Sea, were reasonably well informed about the unrest brewing
in Ottoman Arabia. In fact, just before the war broke out, Sharif Hussein ibn
Ali sent one of his sons, Emir Abdullah ibn Hussein, on a secret mission to
Egypt to contact the British military commander-in-chief there, Lord Kitchener.
What support, if any, could he expect from the British if he rebelled against
his Ottoman overlords? The response was cautious and qualified, but
not discouraging. When war came the British quickly positioned themselves as
the principal backers of the Hashemite cause.
Covert British shipments of
weapons and money from Egypt to Arabia continued throughout 1915, allowing
Sharif Hussein ibn Ali to expand his tribal alliances and build up his forces
while waiting for the most opportune moment to strike. He also made contact
with the main Arab nationalist movement in Syria, the urban-based al-Fatat
group, which greatly expanded the potential of the rebellion. By combining the
nomadic Arabian clans’ ability to field large numbers of fighting men with the
pan-Arab nationalist agenda of al-Fatat, Hussein ibn Ali ensured that the
revolt he started would have far-reaching consequences.
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