Before we begin
the actual study of the development of Greek thinking, we must first note that,
to our present knowledge, this conceptual approach is the only one in antiquity
to develop a precise interest in logically rigorous abstract generalisations
and for an argumentative treatment of problems. Scholars who studied the
origins of philosophical speculation have often underlined the significance
that – in the process – may have had both linguistic and political factors. It
is impossible here properly to discuss either of them, but we may well briefly mention
some considerations. Such scholars who maintain the significance of linguistic
factors, have remarked that while other ancient languages, such as classic
Hebrew, have both an extremely simple grammar and syntax, in Greek the precise
meaning of names in a sentence is defined by both article and declension and
that verbs are especially complex. Thus, whenever a common name is united with
an article, the meaning is automatically restricted to one or a few, precisely identified,
individual objects or beings, whenever no article is used the same word
signifies the whole category or class of objects which may be called by that
name. At the same time the niceties of verbal flection, such as the use of dual
or of aorist, allow for an extreme precision of speech. Obviously this does not
mean that the interpretation of a text never poses problems, especially when, as
it often happens with philosophical works, they survive as isolated quotations.
The significant thing is that, as a language is the work of a whole people, the
Greek language testifies, as such, to a generalised interest in clear,
unambiguous speech and for the possibility
of abstract thought. As far as politics are concerned, the socio-political
organisation of the Greeks is characterised by a more or less early, general
evolution towards democratic assemblies. Even the Homeric poems show us chiefs
who have to account for their actions at pop- ular meetings or have to argue
and persuade numbers of people in order to win their support for their plans. We
do not know whether this already occurred in Mycenean times, but the arts of persuasive
oratory and of clear argument were already vital in archaic Greece. This implied
logical argument as a necessary tool in debates in the assembly, and this is a natural premise
to an argued philosophy and science. Indeed, traditions indicate that most of
the older philosophers were leading political figures in their towns: were they
eminent politicians because they were natural philosophers or was it the habit
of political debates that led them to debate natural truths as well? To all
this we must add a peculiarity of Greek religion: the Greeks lived in a number of
entirely independent communities; this clearly favoured the development in each community
of local varieties of even the most widespread myths, whereas the lack of a “sacred
book” and of an organised and hierarchical clergy made it difficult to charge
people with heresy. Such a charge was posed in a few instances, but, as a
general rule, thinkers felt free to propose new interpretations and elaboration
of traditional myths (as is amply proved by dramatists and comedians) or to
propose entirely new myths. In fact when objectively considered, the so-called “scientific
theories” of the early philosophers are nothing but myths, as we shall see
further on. Finally, and we shall return to this point as well, the special
significance that the “impassible Gods” had in Greek religion must be minded as
well. These Deities maintain the laws of the “cosmos”,
of men and destiny. They watch the order of the universe, can not be prayed to
and to them even Zeus must bow.
Social Plugin